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CONSOLIDATING LOCAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: SHOULD PROSECUTORS
CONTROL THE JAILS?
Adam M. Gershowitz*
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors hold most of the power in the American criminal
justice system.1 After making the initial decision to charge a
suspect, prosecutors have a wide menu of offenses to choose from.
2
A large number of potential charges and huge authorized sentences
then give prosecutors the leverage to pressure defendants to plead
guilty.3 The criminal justice system runs on plea bargaining, and
prosecutors have the stronger hand in plea negotiations. 4  A
defendant's eventual sentence is therefore likely to be closer to the
prosecutor's starting point than the defense attorney's proposal. 5 No
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of
Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Elizabeth Rademacher for
helpful research assistance.
1. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power,
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IowA L. REV. 393, 408-15 (2001) (cataloging the
enormous power of prosecutors and opportunity for abuse of that power).
2. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 512-19 (2001).
3. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of
Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 857 (2015). In the federal system, on
average, the trial penalty is three times the plea bargained sentence. Id.
4. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009); Stuntz, supra note 2, at
538 ("[B]roadening criminal liability makes it easier, across a range of cases, to
induce a guilty plea-precisely because the prosecution is so likely to win if the
case goes to trial.").
5. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment
Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) ('The prosecutor's charging decisions
control [the sentencing] range to begin with."); Jeffrey Standen, Plea
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1478-80
(1993). Of course, other factors are at play as well. See Ronald F. Wright &
Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on
Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1953-57
(2006) (examining how the structure of criminal codes, including sentencing
ranges and the number of different offenses, affects plea bargaining and
sentencing).
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serious observer disputes that prosecutors drive sentencing and hold
most of the power in the United States criminal justice system. 6
Another obvious truth about the American criminal justice
system is mass incarceration. Incarceration in America has
quintupled since the 1970s. 7  At present, the United States
incarcerates more people than any other nation in the history of the
world-in excess of two million.8 Numerous official policies have
undoubtedly contributed to the incarceration explosion. Some blame
likely lies in harsh drug sentences. 9  Three-strikes laws have
seemingly also had an impact. 10 And the widespread abolition of
parole at the federal and state level has contributed to the
overcrowding of prisons as well. 1
This Essay does not focus on the official policies and statutory
enactments that have contributed to mass incarceration, however.
Rather, this Essay attempts to look behind the curtain at the
6. With the exception of the Supreme Court, which has remarked thatprosecutors and defense attorneys "arguably possess relatively equal bargaining
power." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
7. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 1 (2d ed. 2006).
8. See MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO REDUCE CRIME
AND END MASS INCARCERATION 8 (2005) ('The United States now locks up a
higher percentage of its population than any country in the world."); Rachel E.
Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713,
1713 (2006) ("In 2004, the number of individuals incarcerated in the United
States exceeded the two million mark.").
9. See Barkow, supra note 8, at 1713 n.5. Professor John Pfaff rejects the
argument that prison growth has been driven by longer sentences. See John F.
Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 109("Prison populations do not appear to be particularly durable, so yesterday's
decisions do not shape tomorrow's prison populations as strongly as may have
been thought."); John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth,
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2012) ("[S]entence lengths have generally
remained relatively short, and evidence suggests that sentence lengths do not
explain much of the increase in the U.S. prison population."); John F. Pfaff, The
Myths and Realities of Correctional Severity: Evidence from the National
Corrections Reporting Program on Sentencing Practices, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
491, 491 (2011) (contending that admissions practices, not sentence lengths,
have driven increased incarceration). I do not take a position on the definitive
cause of prison growth, because I am not sure of the answer. Rather thandebate the historical cause over the last four decades, this Essay explores an
avenue to decrease incarceration moving forward.
10. See RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AGING
BEHIND BARS: "THREE STRIKES" SEVEN YEARS LATER 11 (2001),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/agingbehindbars.pdf.
11. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEARQUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 7 (2007),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-25-Year
-Quagmire-The-War-On-Drugs-and-Its-Impact-on.American.Society.pdf.
Professor Kevin Reitz has questioned this common assertion, however. See
Kevin R. Reitz, Don't Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been
Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1787, 1794-99 (2006).
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underlying problem that fails to constrain prosecutors' behavior-
the so-called correctional free lunch.12 Put briefly, prosecutors do
not have to internalize the costs of their sentencing decisions
because they do not have to run and pay for the prisons and jails. 13
That responsibility falls to the wardens who run the prisons and the
sheriffs who run the jails. 14 In short, prosecutors effectively hold the
power to sentence inmates, but not the responsibility to pay for the
consequences. 15 As such, the criminal justice system does not create
an incentive for prosecutors to offer lenient plea bargains.
16
Consider a defendant charged with theft. Under our current
"system," the prosecutor has no responsibility for dealing with the
defendant after he leaves the courtroom. 17 So the prosecutor can
decide to be tough and demand that the defendant serve a six-month
sentence.' 8 After all, the sheriff runs the jail, so the sheriff will have
to find a cell for the inmate and the money to fund his incarceration
for six months.
But what if the prosecutor had to deal with the inmate after the
conviction was entered? What if the prosecutor had to worry about
12. The term comes from Professors Zimring and Hawkins. See FRANKLIN
E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991). More
recently, Professor David Ball has tackled the problem from multiple angles.
See W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060, 1062-63
(2014) [hereinafter Ball, Defunding State Prisons] (arguing for block grants to
even out imprisonment by counties); W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the
State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties'
Incarceration Rates--and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 991-97
(2012) [hereinafter Ball, Tough on Crime] (analyzing the correctional free lunch
at the county level in California); W. David Ball, Why State Prisons?, 33 YALE L.
& POLY REV. 75, 77-78 (2014) [hereinafter Ball, Why State Prisons?] (tracing
the historical origins of state prison funding); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, An
Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
47, 50-51 (2008) (arguing for prison population statistics to be regularly
delivered to line prosecutors so that they will consider them during plea
bargaining negotiations); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 720-21 (1996) (proposing that states allocate
funding to counties to prosecute cases, while allowing the counties to keep the
surplus they do not use or requiring them to fund any overages at the county
level).
13. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 140.
14. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
15. Cf. Misner, supra note 12, at 720 ("[Llocal prosecutors effectively dictate
the level of spending that the state legislature must maintain.").
16. See id. at 720-21.
17. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A SECOND LOOK AT ALLEVIATING JAIL
OVERCROWDING: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 8-11 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffileslfbja/182507.pdf (setting forth a "Flowchart of Criminal Justice
Decision Points and Options").
18. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS - 2003, at 451 tbl.5.48 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl
/Digitization/208756NCJRS.pdf (noting a six-month mean sentence for larceny
defendants sentenced to jail).
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overcrowded jails and correctional budget shortfalls? 19  The
prosecutor might then think twice about the six-month sentence.
Perhaps she would be willing to plea bargain down to a four-month
sentence to slightly reduce the jail population and the accompanying
expenses.
This Essay explores how to force prosecutors to have "skin in
the game" after convictions are entered. The problem I tackle is
limited to local jails. And the answer I offer is that local prosecutors
should bear responsibility for their local jails. Prosecutors should be
responsible for checking inmates in and out of the local jails, and
they should be in charge of the overall jail budgets. Consolidating
criminal justice to put prosecutors in charge of jails should have at
least three benefits.
First, and most obviously, prosecutors would be incentivized to
offer more lenient plea bargains in misdemeanor cases. If
prosecutors were responsible for jail budgets, they would want jails
to be less crowded, less expensive, and easier to manage. Because
misdemeanor defendants almost always serve their time in local
jails,20  prosecutors would want to shorten the length of
misdemeanor sentences to reduce jail overcrowding. Thus, a
prosecutor who typically demands a six-month sentence for the
average theft defendant might instead be willing to plead the case to
four months.
Second, and relatedly, prosecutors would also downgrade or
dismiss charges so as to limit jail admissions. For example, in some
jurisdictions, a defendant found with a crack pipe containing a trace
amount of cocaine will be charged with possession of a controlled
substance and will ultimately be sentenced to jail time.21  If
prosecutors had to pay for those jail beds, however, they very well
might agree to a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia, which
typically carries a maximum sentence of a fine. 22
Third, and far less obviously, putting prosecutors in charge of
local jails might also spur lower plea bargain offers in felony cases. 23
19. Sheriffs are forced to confront this problem repeatedly. See, e.g., James
Pinkerton, County Jail Cited for Dangerous Overcrowding, Hous. CHRON. (Oct.
10, 2011, 8:25 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/County
-jail-cited-for-dangerous-overcrowding-2212138.php (discussing Harris County
Jail, which had 355 more inmates than the facility was authorized to hold, and
quoting the Sheriff as saying that he had requested funding for 260 jailers but
that he was turned down).
20. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective
Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 277, 290 (2011).
21. See infra Part III.A.2.
22. See id.
23. There is a risk that in borderline cases-those where the prosecutor
could either plead the case down to a misdemeanor carrying a year in jail, or
push for a felony conviction that would send the defendant to a state prison-
putting prosecutors in charge of the jails would incentivize them to push for the
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Felony defendants typically serve their time in state prisons.24 But
that does not mean felony defendants are completely disconnected
from local jails. Most felony defendants are incarcerated in local
jails while they await trial.25 If prosecutors were responsible for jail
budgets, they would have an incentive to move felony defendants
through the system more quickly in order to move them out of local
jails where they are awaiting trial and into state prisons where they
would serve their sentences at state expense. 26 The easiest way to
move felony defendants through the system would be to plea bargain
their cases faster.27 And the easiest way to plea bargain cases faster
would be to offer defendants more lenient plea deals.28
If I am correct that putting prosecutors in charge of jails would
lower up-front sentences and thus begin to reduce mass
incarceration in jails (and, to a lesser extent, prisons), the next
question is whether it would be legal to do so. The answer is yes.
There is no separation of powers problem or constitutional
impediment to giving prosecutors responsibility for jails. However,
legislatures across the country would have to amend their statutes.
At present, most state statutes specifically place sheriffs in charge of
county jails.29  States would have to alter their statutory
frameworks to consolidate (even more) criminal justice power in the
hands of prosecutors. 30
tougher sentence to move an inmate out of the jail and into the state prison
where he would be on the State's balance sheet. See infra Part III.A.2.
24. This Essay does not propose that county prosecutors be put in charge of
state prisons.
25. In 2009, the median time from arrest to adjudication for detained
defendants was sixty-eight days. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009-STATISTICAL TABLES 22
(2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
26. See W. David Ball, 'A False Idea of Economy" Costs, Counties, and the
Origins of the California Correctional System, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI., Mar. 2016, at 26, 27.
27. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117,
1122-23 (2008).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-502 (2016) ('The county sheriff of each
county in this state shall have the custody, rule, and charge of the jail within
his or her county. . . .'); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-511 (2016) ("IT]he sheriff
shall have charge and custody of the jails of the county, and of the prisoners in
the jails, and shall supervise them himself or herself or through a deputy or
jailer."); IDAHO CODE § 20-601 (2016) ("The common jails in the several counties
of this state are kept by the sheriffs of the counties in which they are
respectively situated ... ."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 211.030(1) (2015) ("The sheriff is
the custodian of the jail in his or her county.., and shall keep the jail
personally, or by his or her deputy, or by a jailer or jailers appointed by the
sheriff for that purpose, for whose acts the sheriff is responsible."). While the
language in each state's statute differs, they all effectively place the sheriffs in
charge of the jails.
30. Sheriffs' departments would likely oppose the change, and local
prosecutors would likely be hostile as well. It is therefore an uphill climb, but of
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly reviews the
well-known mass incarceration problem in the United States, with
particular attention to jails. Part II describes the "correctional free
lunch" that enables prosecutors to demand tough sentences without
having to pay for the costs of incarceration. Part III then sets forth
a framework in which prosecutors would be in charge of jail budgets
and the intake and release of prisoners, while leaving discipline and
day-to-day safety of the jails under the control of sheriffs'
departments. Part III also responds to the objection that such a
division of labor between prosecutors (budget control) and sheriffs
(ensuring safety) would be problematic.
I. MASS INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States is plagued by the problem of mass
incarceration. While there is some debate as to the official policies
and laws that have led to mass incarceration in the United States,
there is little debate that the problem exists. 31 The statistics are
familiar and troubling.
The United States incarcerates about 2.2 million individuals. 32
One out of almost every one hundred adults is incarcerated at any
given time in the United States. 33 And that does not include the
nearly five million non-incarcerated people who are otherwise under
control of the criminal justice system because they are on probation
or parole. 34
To put matters in perspective, the United States' incarceration
rate is three times that of Israel, five times that of England, six
times greater than Australia and Canada, eight times that of
France, and twelve times greater than Japan.35
It was not always this way. For most of the twentieth century,
incarceration was far lower and comparable to European nations. 36
As recently as the 1970s, there were only 326,000 inmates
incarcerated in the United States. 37 In the 1970s, 160 of every
course most systemic improvements to the criminal justice system are not easily
accomplished.
31. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
32. See JACOBSON, supra note 8, at 8.
33. The number in 2012 was one out of every 108 adults. LAUREN E. GLAZE
& ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/cpusl2.pdf.
34. See DANIELLE KAEBLE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 2 tbl.1 (rev. ed. 2016),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf.
35. Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 52.
36. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 13-15
(2006).
37. See MAUER, supra note 7, at 17.
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100,000 people were incarcerated.38 By 1985, that number climbed
to 313 of every 100,000 people. 39 A decade later the number nearly
doubled to 601 per 100,000 people. 40 And the ratio peaked shortly
after the turn of the century at 751 per 100,000 people in 2008.41
When scholars focus on mass incarceration, they
understandably devote most of their attention to prisons. 42 Over
two-thirds of all inmates-about 1.5 million people-are convicted
felons who are incarcerated in prisons. 43  Yet, while prison
populations deserve considerable attention, it is important not to
overlook America's jails. On any given day, nearly three-quarters of
a million people are incarcerated in jails throughout the country.44
And just like prisons, jail populations have grown exponentially
since the 1970s. In 1978, there were 158,394 inmates in American
jails.45 By 1988 that number had climbed to 343,569 inmates. 46 In
1998 it was 592,462 inmates.4 7 And by 2008 there were 785,533
people in jail. 48
Not surprisingly, exponential jail growth led to overcrowded
facilities. A 2000 report from the Justice Department noted that:
In the 1-year period ending June 30, 1998, the nation's jails
operated at 97-percent capacity, despite the addition of 26,216
beds during the preceding 12-month period and some 250,000
beds during the preceding 10 years. Jails with the largest
38. Id.
39. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 488 tbl.6.13.
40. Id.
41. Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas
/23iht-23prison.12253738.html. There is some cause for optimism, though. In
recent years, incarceration in the United States has come down slightly. The
total number of prisoners dropped by nearly 90,000 between 2008 and 2014.
See KAEBLE ET AL., supra note 34, at 2 tbl.1. This amounts to an average of a 1%
decline every year since 2007. Id. at 1. The drop is obviously modest, however,
given the historical story.
42. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 51 (proposing the "de-
escalat[ion] [of] mass imprisonment by mandating a simple informational
campaign directed at prosecutors").
43. See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014, at 1
(2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf.
44. See KAEBLE ET AL., supra note 34, at 2 tbl.1.
45. LOUIs W. JANKOwSKI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES 1991, at 3
tbl.5 (1992), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji91.pdf.
46. Id.
47. ALLEN J. BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 6 tbl.7 (2001), http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/pjim00.pdf.
48. TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF JAILS: POPULATION
CHANGES, 1999-2013, at 8 tbl.2 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/cjpc9913.pdf. Jail populations peaked in 2008. Id. In the last few years, the
number of inmates has fallen modestly to between 730,000 and 745,000. Id.
683
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average daily populations-1,000 or more inmates-reported
operating at 103 percent of rated capacity. 49
By 2014, jails were far less full nationwide, with incarceration
levels having fallen to 84% of capacity.50 In part, however, this was
because rated capacity had increased so much.5 1 As of mid-2014-
the last year for which the Bureau of Justice Statistics has data-
America's jails were equipped to handle nearly 900,000 inmates.5 2
Even as jail capacity has grown substantially on a national
basis, some jails still remain chronically overcrowded. 53  This
includes, most prominently, several large jails. For example, in
Houston, Texas, the local jail recently had to ship one hundred
inmates to another jurisdiction because of lack of space. 54 In Santa
Barbara, California, the jail is rated to hold about 700 inmates but
regularly houses between 800 and 1000.55
While large jails have attracted a lot of attention, it has actually
been jail populations in smaller facilities that have grown the most.
In a 2015 study, the Vera Institute of Justice found that "mid-sized
and small counties-which account for the vast majority of jails-
have largely driven growth, with local jail populations increasing by
4.1 times in mid-sized counties and 6.9 times in small counties." 56
In many smaller counties, overcrowding has become a crisis
because the number of jail beds has not kept pace with inmate
growth. For instance, in Yellowstone County, Montana, the jail was
built to hold 286 inmates but was holding about 480 inmates in late
49. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A SECOND LOOK AT ALLEVIATING JAIL CROWDING:
A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 1 (2000) (footnote omitted), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/bjall82507.pdf.
50. See TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES
AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 6 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 887 (2009) ("Correctional facilities across
the country are chronically overcrowded .. ").
54. See Michael Barajas, Why the Harris County Jail Is Overcrowded with
Legally Innocent People, Hous. PRESS (July 1, 2015, 10:40 AM),
http://www.houstonpress.com/news/why-the-harris-county-jail-is-overcrowded
-with-legally-innocent-people-7555627. The sheriffs office and state officials
have publicly fought over the need to add more beds. See Kiah Collier, State:
Harris County Has Not Done Enough to Cut Jail Population, Hous. CHRON.
(Feb. 10, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics
/houston/article/State-Harris-County-has-not-done-enough-to-cut-5222788.php.
55. David Minsky, A Tale of Two Jails: Will the Northern Branch of the
Santa Barbara County Jail System Finally Get Built?, SANTA MARIA SUN (June
23, 2015), http://www.santamariasun.com/cover/13346/a-tale-of-two-jails-will
-the-northern-branch-of-the-santa-barbara-countyjail-systemfinally-getbuit/.
56. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IN OUR OWN
BACKYARD: CONFRONTING GROWTH AND DISPARITIES IN AMERICAN JAILS 8 (2015),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/incarceration-trends
-in-our-own-backyard.pdf.
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2014.57 In Bangor, Maine, the jail has 143 beds but sometimes
houses 180 inmates. 58 In Boulder County, Colorado, the sheriff has
had to strike deals with other counties to take inmates because the
Boulder County jail is at capacity. 59 In Franklin County, Arkansas,
the jail has beds for twenty-six inmates, but has housed double that
number. 60 During 2015, the Vanderburgh County jail in Indiana
repeatedly housed over 600 inmates even though its capacity was
540; in October 2015 the jail was operating at 115% capacity.61
Overcrowding has significant consequences for the inmates. For
instance, in the Buchanan County jail in Missouri-which should
house no more than 180 inmates, but regularly has a population
over 200-some inmates are forced to sleep on the floor. 62  In
Hamilton County, Tennessee, which regularly operates at 110%
capacity, some inmates sleep side-by-side on the floor and others
make due with no toilet paper. 63 In Fulton County, Georgia, broken
locks allowed dangerous inmates to wander around the jail.64
The overcrowding places sheriffs in a difficult position. Jailers
do not decide how many people will be arrested or sentenced, and
they are not in a position to refuse new inmates.65 So, they must
57. Eddie Gregg, Safely Easing Jail Overcrowding: Judge Believes Program
Could Save Millions, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Oct. 1, 2014), http://billingsgazette.com
/newsflocallcrime-and-courts/safely-easing-jail-overcrowding-judge-believes
-program-could-save-millions/article_232484c4-d2Od-50d4-8dbe-
c49b32eedefe.html.
58. Daniel Hartill, LePage Calls Jail Summit as Sheriffs Warn of
Overcrowding, Budget Crisis, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Apr. 28, 2013, 6:50 AM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/04/28/politics/lepage-calls-jail-summit-as
-sheriffs-warn-of-overcrowding-budget-crisis.
59. Joe Rubino, Boulder County Sheriff May Cut Deal to House Overflow
Inmates in Broomfield, DAILY CAMERA (July 29, 2014, 1:38 PM),
http://www.dailycamera.comboulder-county-news/ci_26236025boulder-county
-sheriff-talking-broomfield-about-longterm-j ail.
60. Thomas Saccente, Franklin County to Address Jail Problems, TIMES
REC. (Apr. 3, 2016, 12:17 AM), http://www.swtimes.com/news/franklin
-county-address-jail-problems.
61. John Martin, Jail Overcrowding Becoming Major Concern, Officials
Say, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.courierpress.com
/news/local]jail-overcrowding-becoming-major-concern-officials-say- 2 80ba511-
1449-45c8-e053-0100007f28d4-364029061.html.
62. Buchanan Co. Commissioners Discuss Budget, Jail Population,
STJOECHANNEL.COM (Jan. 4, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://www.stjoechannel.com/news
[buchanan-co-commissioners-discuss-budget-jail-population.
63. Shelly Bradbury, Overcrowded and Understaffed Hamilton County Jail
Leaves Inmates Without Basic Necessities, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS
(Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/ 2 01 6/mar
/05fbehind-bars-hamiltcounty-jail-inmates-caught/35 3 58 2 .
64. Rhonda Cook, Fulton Jail No Longer Under Court Oversight, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. (Apr. 23, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.myajc.com/news/news
/fulton-j ail-no-longer-under-court-oversight/nk2sp.
65. See MARK A. CUNNIFF, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL CROWDING:
UNDERSTANDING JAIL POPULATION DYNAMICS 16 (2002), http://static.nicic.gov
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plead for additional funding. But legislators sometimes turn a deaf
ear. For instance, in Maine, county sheriffs repeatedly requested
additional funding to hire guards, but legislators refused on the
ground that "[e]veryone else lives within their budget, [so sheriffs
should not] keep coming back and asking for a supplemental
[budget].'66
Inmates and advocacy organizations such as the ACLU have
brought litigation about overcrowding and the resulting poor
confinement conditions.6 7 The result in some jurisdictions has been
consent decrees, 68 Department of Justice supervision,69 independent
monitors, 70 and court oversight of jails.7 1  In some instances,
monitoring persists for over a decade.7 2 And some judges have gone
so far as to order sheriffs to reduce inmate populations 73 and to
/Library/017209.pdf. There are exceptions. In early 2015, the sheriff in Greene
County, Missouri, refused to accept any more municipal inmates-those
convicted of low-level municipal crimes-because he lacked the space. Harrison
Keegan et al., Sheriff: Jail Can't Hold City Inmates, Let Serious Criminals Go,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Apr. 3, 2015, 8:24 PM), http://www.news-leader.com
/story/news/local/ozarks/20 15/04/03/sheriff-jail-will-longer-accept-city-prisoners
/25237529. Shortly thereafter, the city sued him. Harrison Keegan, Sheriff
Arnott 'Disappointed' that City Sued Him, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (July 16,
2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.news-leader.com/story/news/politics/2015/07/16
/sheriff-arnott-disappointed-city-sued/30268539.
66. Peter McGuire, Crowded, Budget-Crunched County Jails to Ask Maine
Legislature for Help, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 4, 2015),
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/10/04/crowded-budget-crunched-county-jails
-to-ask-maine-legislature-for-help.
67. See, e.g., Cano v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp. 3d 65, 70-71 (E.D.N.Y.
2015); Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Lawsuit Challenges
Grossly Inadequate Conditions at Canyon County Jail (Jan. 9, 2009),
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-lawsuit-challenges-grossly-inadequate
-conditions-canyon-county-jail.
68. See, e.g., John Simerman & Ramon Antonio Vargas, Orleans Parish
Prison Consent Decree is Blueprint for Reforms at Troubled Facility, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Dec. 11, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/12
/orleans-parish-prisonsconsent.html.
69. See, e.g., Carrie Napoleon, Deal Near to End Federal Oversight of Lake
Jail, CHI. TRIB. (May 28, 2015, 5:09 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com
/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-lake-jail-oversight-st-0528-20150528
-story.html (describing four-year supervision by Department of Justice).
70. See, e.g., Mark Lungariello, Deal Reached over Inmate Conditions at
Westchester Jail, LOHUD (Nov. 25, 2015, 6:35 AM), http://www.lohud.com/story
/news/crime/2015/11/25/deal-reached-over-inmate-conditions-westchester
-county-jail/76334538.
71. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 64 (discussing a decade of federal oversight
of Fulton County jail).
72. See Brian Lawson, Fourteen Years Later Madison County Jail Still
Under Federal Court Order to Provide Medical Care, AL.COM (Oct. 21, 2014,
4:59 PM), http://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2014/10/madison-county
jail-stillunde.html.
73. See, e.g., Jameson Cook, Macomb County Sheriff Releases 104 Jail
Inmates to Reduce Overcrowding, MACOMB DAILY (June 19, 2015, 11:42 AM),
http://www.macombdaily.com/article/MD/20150619/NEWS/150619594 ("The
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threaten county commissioners with jail if they do not take action.
74
Yet, bold actions are the exception. Litigation has made only a
small dent in the jail overcrowding problem and successful reform
through civil rights litigation is more difficult now than in decades
past.75
In short, jails, like prisons, are overcrowded across the United
States.76  The overcrowding is dangerous and results in poor
confinement conditions for the inmates. The sheriffs who run the
jails would, in most cases, like nothing better than to eliminate the
overcrowding. 77 Unfortunately, sheriffs have little control over how
many inmates they receive, and they must plead for funds to pay for
the inmates sent to them by prosecutors. Part II below explains this
correctional free lunch problem in greater detail.
II. THE CORRECTIONAL FREE LUNCH AND THE DIFFICULTY OF
ELIMINATING IT
In a 1991 book, Professors Zimring and Hawkins identified a
troubling phenomenon that they called the correctional free lunch.
78
The concept was simple yet deeply problematic: prosecutors make
charging decisions and have enormous power over sentencing, but
they do not have to pay for the financial ramifications of their
decisions. 79 Prosecutors typically operate at the county level, but
prison beds are paid for by the state.80 Thus, as Professor David
Ball has colorfully put it, prosecutors get to be tough on crime on the
state's dime.81 The same problem exists at the local level, albeit
releases were in response to Chief Judge James Biernat on Wednesday ordering
a 25-percent sentence cut for certain inmates ....."); Jennifer Feehan, U.S.
Judge Orders Jail to Cap, Reduce Inmates by Dec. 30, BLADE (Nov. 6, 2014,
11:47 AM), http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/201 4/11/06/U-S-judge-orders-jail
-to-cap-reduce-inmates-by-Dec-30.html.
74. See Cook, supra note 64.
75. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 273 (2015).
76. Cf. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 4 ("Jails-with 11 million
admissions annually and a third of all Americans behind bars on a given day-
are increasingly recognized as a key engine of mass incarceration.").
77. See, e.g., Cristina Flores, Sheriff Unveils New Plan to Manage
Overcrowding at Salt Lake County Jail, KUTV.COM (Mar. 4, 2016),
http:/Ikutv.com/news/local/sheriff-unveils-new-plan-to-manage-overcrowding-at
-salt-lake-county-jail.
78. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 140.
79. See id. at 140, 211-15.
80. See id. at 211.
81. Ball, Tough on Crime, supra note 12, at 1004; see also JOSEPH DILLON
DAVEY, THE POLITICS OF PRISON EXPANSION 83 (1998) ("[C]ountless offenders are
prosecuted by locally elected prosecutors ... who have little or no concern about
how those prisons are funded."); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARv. L. REV. 781, 838-39 (2006) ("Because state rather
than local taxpayers pay for prison beds, local prosecutors tend to 'spend' those
beds more readily than they should.").
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with different actors. Local prosecutors have control over charging
and plea bargaining, but local sheriffs are responsible for the jails.82
The correctional free lunch is a widespread problem that likely
results in prosecutors pursuing (and procuring) tougher sentences
than they would seek if they had to pay the bills themselves. A run-
of-the-mill plea bargaining example helps to illustrate the problem.
Consider a robbery defendant who has previous felony convictions
and was caught dead-to-rights leaving the scene of the crime. In ajurisdiction where the maximum sentence for robbery is ten years, a
clearly guilty defendant will not want to go to trial because of the
harsh possible penalty and the low chance of prevailing.8 3 The stiff
maximum sentence thus gives the prosecutor a huge amount of
bargaining leverage.8 4 What cabins that enormous leverage? The
answer is not money.8 5 The moment the defendant pleads guilty,
the prosecutor will no longer have any skin in the game. The
convicted individual becomes the state's problem because the state
pays for the cost of incarcerating the inmate in a state prison.8 6
The only real restraint cabining the prosecutor's plea
negotiations is the sentence that the trial judge would likely mete
out if the defendant refused to plea bargain87 Let's say, for
example, that most lawyers in the jurisdiction presume the judge
would hand down a six-year sentence for a robbery defendant with
prior felonies. As long as the prosecutor offers a sentence noticeably
lower than six years, she knows that the defendant will likely accept
it because it is better than what the defendant would get from thejudge.8 8 So, for purposes of our hypothetical, let us assume that the
82. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 139-40.
83. See Davis, supra note 1, at 408-09 (observing that defendants are
typically "not willing to run the risk of additional and more serious convictions
and more prison time" by going to trial).
84. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 537 ("[Mlost prosecutors insist on bargains
very early in the process, and punish defendants who resist settlement until
shortly before trial."); see also Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea
Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1254 (2008)(observing that prosecutors often overcharge defendants "because of the
bargaining leverage it provides").
85. In other aspects of the criminal justice system, money does restrain
actors. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1277-80 (1999) (explaining how the cost of
Fourth Amendment compliance influences police officers, primarily by driving
them to poorer communities); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1821-23 (1998) (same).
86. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 211.
87. See Covey, supra note 84, at 1246-47 (describing "plea bargaining's
pricing mechanism" in terms of "the probability of conviction," the "anticipated
sentence upon conviction at trial," and the "resources saved by avoiding trial").
88. To play out the game theory, the prosecutor would likely have to come
in sufficiently below six years to ensure that a criminal defendant (who might
not be as risk averse as average law-abiding citizens) will not gamble in the
hopes of getting lucky and receiving a lenient sentence from the judge.
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prosecutor offers (and the defendant feels compelled to accept) a
five-year plea bargain.
Perhaps five years is the "right" result. From a retributive
perspective, the defendant might deserve five years. Or from a
deterrence perspective, five years might maximize general
deterrence and prevent other robberies. Maybe five years is the
right amount of time to incapacitate this particular defendant. If
five years is the correct length of incarceration, then there is no
problem for us to solve. The prosecutor is using her power and
discretion to achieve the best result for the criminal justice system.
The state is paying for five years of incarceration because that is
what is best for society.
There are reasons to be skeptical that five years is the best
result, however.8 9 First, society has not determined an optimal
sentence for robbery from a retributive, deterrence, or incapacitation
perspective. There is likely widespread agreement that murder-for-
hire should typically be punished by life imprisonment or death.
90
And, conversely, nearly everyone agrees that jaywalking does not
merit any incarceration. There is no widespread acceptance,
however, on the appropriate sentence for robbery. 91  Certainly
society does not agree on a granular level that robbery should carry
a five-year sentence as opposed to a four-year sentence.
92
With no intuitively correct sentence, it is difficult to say that
five years is the obviously correct result. Perhaps five years is too
low. Prosecutors may be selling the case at a lower amount simply
because their office is overburdened and they need to clear their
dockets. 93 More likely however, the five-year agreement is too high.
89. Implicit in this discussion is that it is impossible to know what the
"right" sentence should have been. See Ball, Defunding State Prisons, supra
note 12, at 1065.
90. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2012) (providing a sentence of life
imprisonment or death for murder-for-hire that results in death).
91. Compare, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West 2016) (providing a
sentencing range of two to nine years), with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(1)(a)-(b),
3(a)-(b) (McKinney 2016) (providing a sentencing range of three and a half to
twenty-five years).
92. Indeed, scholars differ somewhat on whether society even agrees on the
ordinal ranking of the seriousness of different crimes. Compare Paul H.
Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1854-55 (2007) ("[Pleople tend to agree on the relative
degree of blameworthiness among a set of cases."), with Christopher Slobogin &
Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77,
119 (2013) ("Our research confirms that consensus about the ranking of core
crimes exists, but it also shows that utilitarian concerns can change that
ranking in ways inconsistent with desert.").
93. There is certainly some indication that excessive caseloads affect plea
offers. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests:
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U.
L. REV. 261, 290-92 (2011) (documenting massive caseloads of large prosecutors'
offices); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay
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Perhaps the elected district attorney has nudged sentences up in an
effort to look tough and to propel himself to higher office. 94 Or, more
likely, perhaps the line prosecutor has internalized an office culture
in which success is defined in terms of conviction rates and tough
sentences. 95  If that is correct, perhaps the prosecutor has,
consciously or not, demanded a tougher-than-optimal sentence in
order to meet the office's definition of success. There is some
indirect support for this theory. In a recent study of California's
correctional system, Professor David Ball found that California
counties use state prison resources at very different rates and that
the counties that send the largest portion of inmates to state prisons
actually have below-average crime rates. 96
A second reason to be skeptical that the five-year sentence is
optimal is the existence of the mass incarceration problem itself. In
a nation with 2.2 million people incarcerated and another 5 million
people under the supervision of the criminal justice system, 97 there
is strong reason to think that prosecutors are not imposing the
optimal up-front sentence, at least for retributive and deterrence
purposes. Put simply, if there is a strong argument that the United
States is too punitive and overuses prisons writ large, then we can
logically infer that the most powerful actor in the system-the
prosecutor-is demanding up-front sentences in run-of-the-mill
cases that may simply be too high.
All of this is not to say that prosecutors are behaving
unethically; most line prosecutors are extremely diligent, hard-
working, and conscientious lawyers. I am certainly not suggesting
that prosecutors are intentionally over-punishing in an effort to be
promoted or to exact unjustified vengeance on criminal defendants.
Rather, the problem is that when prosecutors are unconstrained by
the financial costs of their decisions, they demand tougher plea
bargains than they would seek if they had to stomach the financial
costs. 98 Setting aside cases like murder and jaywalking, in which
the right sentence is apparent, there is quite a bit of play in the
on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecutions, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583,
601 (2005) ("Extreme docket pressure characterizes DAs' offices ....").
94. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 534 ("[A]t the most basic level, elected
legislators and elected prosecutors are natural allies. Both need to please
voters in order to survive, and for both, pleasing voters means essentially the
same thing: punishing people voters want to see punished.").
95. Cf. Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134-35 (2004)("Prosecutors with the highest conviction rates (and, thus, reputations as the
best performers) stand the greatest chance for advancement internally.").
96. Ball, Tough on Crime, supra note 12, at 1023.
97. KAEBLE ETAL., supra note 34, at 2 tbl.1.
98. See DAVEY, supra note 81, at 83; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 12, at
211.
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sentencing joints throughout the criminal justice system. 99  If
prosecutors do not internalize the financial costs, it stands to reason
that they will push sentences above where they would be if costs
were part of the equation.
Assuming that the correctional free lunch is driving sentences
up, there are two follow-up questions: First, why have states
subsidized the free lunch? And second, what can be done about it?
The answer to the first question is likely historical. Professor
David Ball recently posited that the free lunch stems from the
prison reform movement and the economics of prison labor:
Penal reformers in the 1800s promoted the establishment of
state prisons as a means of professionalizing and rationalizing
correctional treatment. Reformers were not opposed to prison
labor; indeed, they viewed labor as crucial to rehabilitation.
State governments were only too happy to take on prisoners,
since their labor generated revenue for the state .... The
correctional free lunch started out as a catered lunch for the
state.100
Of course, times are very different today. The prison population
has exploded and states are now spending a fortune on
imprisonment. 0 1  Like other government programs, it is very
difficult to take away a subsidy once it has become entrenched.
Thus, the second question has become even more important:
what can be done to eliminate the correctional free lunch and reduce
incarceration? Despite the enormity of the problem, it has attracted
only a modest amount of attention from scholars.
On the more modest end, I proposed in an earlier article that
state prison boards notify prosecutors about prison overcrowding
and trends in admissions. 10 2  This "informational approach"
advocated that the bureau of prisons send a monthly letter to each
county prosecutor that succinctly stated:
(1) the total number of incarcerated prisoners [in the state]; (2)
the increase (or decrease) in the number of prisoners from
previous years; (3) what percentage of the prisons were full
(i.e. whether operating capacity has been exceeded); and (4)
whether any prisons in the state are under a court order
regarding prison overcrowding.
10 3
99. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
100. Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 12, at 78.
101. It is hard to estimate the exact costs of state prisons, but we do know
that states are spending nearly $50 billion per year on corrections. See TRACEY
KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE CORRECTIONS EXPENDITURES, fY
1982-2010, at 1 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scefy8210.pdf.
102. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 65-66.
103. Id. at 65.
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The idea was that if prosecutors better understood how full
prisons were, they would modestly reduce their plea bargain
offers.10 4 My proposal did not directly tackle the correctional free
lunch or put explicit pressure on prosecutors to alter their behavior.
Rather, it relied on subtle psychological techniques to nudge
prosecutors toward more lenient sentencing.105 Other scholars have
gone further.
Over two decades ago, Professor Robert Misner lamented the
unrivaled power of prosecutors and offered a proposal to force
prosecutors to internalize the costs of their charging and sentencing
decisions. He suggested that a state agency determine the amount
of prison space available for the upcoming year.106 Then, based
upon past practices and other demographic information, the prison
resources would be allocated to each prosecutor's office for use
during the following year. 107 If the district attorney used fewer
resources than allocated, the county could keep the remaining
funds. 108 If the chief prosecutor needed additional resources, the
county would have to provide its own local funds to pay for the
prison beds.10 9
Professor David Ball has gone further by recently advocating
that states stop funding prisons.11 0 In place of state prison funding,
he suggests two possibilities. First, states could give counties block
grants to spend as they see fit (including on prison beds if they
wanted)."'1 States would administer the prisons, but the counties
would have to pay for each inmate they send. 112 In a second
proposal, Professor Ball goes even further and suggests ending state
control of prisons and instead shifting responsibility for
incarceration to local criminal justice entities.11 3
There are problems with each of these proposals, unfortunately.
Although I remain convinced that better information flow to
prosecutors could influence them to lower their plea bargains at the
margins, critics are correct that it does not impose any binding
constraints on prosecutors. 1 4 On the flip side, the more ambitious
104. Id. at 67.
105. See id. at 66-67 (noting that the proposal would not drastically change
prosecutorial behavior and that, in comparing mass imprisonment to an
overinflated balloon, the proposal would only seek to "leak a little air out of the
balloon so that it is no longer on the verge of bursting").
106. See Misner, supra note 12, at 720.
107. Id. at 720-21.
108. Id. at 721.
109. Id.
110. Ball, Defunding State Prisons, supra note 12, at 1071-72.
111. Id. at 1072.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1078 (noting that under my approach "rational actors could
try to 'free ride' on the more abstemious behavior of their colleagues across the
state").
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proposals advocated by Professors Misner and Ball would face
considerable political obstacles. 115  Figuring out the correct
allocation of prison beds for each county would be difficult to do and
would leave many counties unhappy with their distribution.
116
Defunding state prisons altogether would be an enormous
restructuring of the criminal justice system. 117 Both approaches
might be better than the status quo, but they are politically
unlikely. I accordingly offer an intermediate proposal below in Part
III.
III. CONSOLIDATING LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A. Prosecutors as Jail CEOs, and Sheriffs as Public Safety Officers
At present, local prosecutors make charging and plea
bargaining decisions that send misdemeanor defendants to local
jails.118 But the prosecutors do not run the local jails. The sheriffs
run the jails." 9 I suggest ending that diffusion of responsibility by
placing local prosecutors in charge of their local jails. Prosecutors,
not sheriffs, should be responsible for checking inmates in and out of
the local jails. And prosecutors, not sheriffs, should be in charge of
the overall jail budgets.
While two-thirds of those incarcerated in the United States are
in prisons,' 20 that does not mean jails are insignificant. At any
given time, more than 700,000 people are confined in jails. 121 And a
considerable number of jails are overcrowded. 122  Placing local
prosecutors in charge of their jails should accomplish three things:
(1) more lenient plea bargain offers in misdemeanor cases; (2) fewer
jail admissions because of charge reductions to fine-only offenses
and more dismissals; and (3) faster and more lenient disposition of
felony cases.
115. See Leon Neyfakh, How to Stop Overzealous Prosecutors, SLATE (Feb.
25, 2015, 8:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-Politics/crime/2015
/02/overzealousprosecutorshold themaccountable-by-defunding-state
prisons.html (observing that these proposals "could potentially introduce
political pressure on prosecutors that they currently don't have to deal with").
116. See, e.g., Leigh Dethman & Josh Loftin, Counties Unhappy with Jail
Payments, DESERET NEWS (Jan. 22, 2006, 12:00 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/635178220/Counties-unhapPy-with-jail
-payments.html.
117. See Ball, Defunding State Prisons, supra note 12, at 1076.
118. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 306-07.
119. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
120. KAEBLE ETAL., supra note 34, at 2 tbl.1.
121. MINTON, supra note 48, at 1.
122. See supra Part I.
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1. More Lenient Misdemeanor Sentences
First, and most obviously, if prosecutors were responsible for
jail budgets, they would have strong incentives to offer more lenient
plea bargains in misdemeanor cases. If prosecutors were on the
hook for jail overcrowding, they would want jails to be less
populated, less expensive, and easier to manage. Because
misdemeanor defendants almost always serve their time in local
jails,123 prosecutors would want to reduce the length of misdemeanor
sentences to reduce jail overcrowding.
For example, instead of insisting on a six-month sentence for a
theft defendant, the prosecutor might agree to a four-month
sentence. If a similar dynamic applied across the board, the results
could be significant. Just as average jail stays have crept up over
the last few decades-in 1978 the average length of stay was nine
days, but by 2014 it was twenty-three days12 4-it could begin to slide
back down.
2. Fewer Jail Admissions Because of Charge Reductions
Placing prosecutors in charge of local jails would also likely lead
to fewer jail admissions. In marginal cases, prosecutors would be
incentivized to dismiss cases or to opt for lower charges. Trace drug
cases are a compelling example. In some jurisdictions-Texas is a
good example-the criminal code has separate offenses for
possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of very small
amounts of controlled substances. In Texas, the paraphernalia
charge is a Class C misdemeanor125-the lowest level crime in the
criminal code-and it carries a maximum sentence of a fine. 126 The
possession' charge, 127 by contrast, is a higher-level misdemeanor
offense and often results in jail time. 128 The prosecutor therefore
has a choice. She can effectively fine drug offenders in trace cases
by filing the Class C paraphernalia charge, or she can send them tojail by filing the possession of a controlled substance charge.
For many years, prosecutors in Houston, Texas, routinely filed
the tougher controlled substance charges. 129 Perhaps they did this
because of pressure from the Houston police union, which argued
that sending the trace case defendants to jail prevented them from
123. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 290.
124. SUBRAMANIAN ETAL., supra note 56, at 11.
125. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.125 (West 2015).
126. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.23 (West 2015).
127. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (West 2015).
128. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35 (West 2015).
129. Cf. Brian Rogers, Harris County DA's Easing of Crack Pipe Policy Stirs
Storm, Hous. CHRON. (Dec. 8, 2009, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news
Jhouston-texas/article/Harris-County-DA-s-easing-of-crack-pipe-policy
-1613537.php.
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committing burglaries and other drug crimes. 130 In 2009, however,
Houston residents elected a new district attorney-Patricia Lykos-
who changed the office policy so that prosecutors would only file
Class C paraphernalia charges if the crack pipe had less than a
hundredth of a gram of drugs. 13 1 According to Lykos, the policy
change was designed in part to reduce jail overcrowding. 132 While
the Houston law enforcement community was very upset about the
change, not surprisingly, the sheriff who oversaw the jail favored
the new policy. 133
The change was short-lived, however. In 2012, a former judge,
Mike Anderson, ran against Lykos in the Republican primary and
campaigned against the policy of using the paraphernalia charge to
dispose of trace cases.13 4 Despite jail overcrowding, Anderson took
the position that a trace amount of drugs was still possession of a
controlled substance and should be prosecuted as such. 135 Anderson
defeated Lykos in the election. 136 Shortly thereafter, he circulated
an internal memorandum instructing prosecutors to bring controlled
substance charges for trace amounts of drugs found not only on
crack pipes but also "[b]rillo pads, syringes, baggies, mirrors, straws,
razor blades, etc." 137
The counter-factual question is whether Anderson would have
taken such a hard-line position if he were in charge of not just
prosecuting the trace cases but also finding space and money to
incarcerate the defendants. If forced to fully internalize the costs of
his prosecutions, perhaps he would have hesitated to pursue the
controlled substance charges. 138
The trace drug cases are only one of many possible examples.
As Professor Jenny Roberts has explained, there are many minor
misdemeanor cases-such as disorderly conduct, public urination,
loitering, and marijuana possession, to name a few-in which
130. Id.
131. Id.; see also William Martin, The Policy and Politics of Drug Sentencing,
TEx. MONTHLY (May 5, 2013), http://www.texasmonthly.com/politics
/the-policy-and-politics-of-drug-sentencing.
132. Rogers, supra note 129.
133. See id.
134. Martin, supra note 131.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. David Jennings, Harris County DA Mike Anderson: If It Looks Like
Drugs, Arrest 'Em!, BIG JOLLY POL. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://bigjollypolitics.com
/harris-county-da-mike-anderson-if-it-looks-like-drugs-arrest-em.
138. Or perhaps he would have added his voice to those encouraging the
Texas legislature to change the penal code to make trace amounts a lesser
offense. See Martin, supra note 131 (noting that Harris County's longest-
serving felony judge writes to each Houston legislator prior to each legislative
session urging them to lower the penalty for trace cases).
695
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
prosecutors could decline to prosecute offenders. 139  Professor
Roberts suggests that more rigorous misdemeanor representation by
defense lawyers could push prosecutors to decline to charge these
low-level cases. 140
There is considerable room for prosecutors to dismiss lower-
level misdemeanor charges.14 1 Research by Professor Josh Bowers
indicates that prosecutors actually decline to prosecute less often in
public order offenses than in serious felonies and misdemeanors. 142
Bowers discovered data about misdemeanor charging and
declination rates in New York and Iowa. 143 That data showed, for
example, that Iowa prosecutors declined to prosecute in 3.21% of
violent misdemeanor cases but only 1.31% of public order
misdemeanors. 144 In New York City, prosecutors declined to proceed
in homicide charges "at more than twice the rate ... that they
declined turnstile hops or prostitution."' 145 Prosecutors do not have
to carefully screen low-level misdemeanors because they know that
the system will force defendants to plead guilty. 146
At present, the criminal justice system does not effectively
pressure prosecutors to decline low-level charges against poor
defendants who will be unable to make bail. 147 Prosecutors charge
those defendants and allow the fact of detention to pressure the
defendants to plead guilty.148 Matters might be different if the
prosecutors were responsible for the costs of the jails. Prosecutors
139. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1089, 1106-07 (2013).
140. Id. at 1107. It could also influence legislators to move them out of the
criminal justice system entirely. Id. Professor Roberts' approach would force
prosecutors to reassess their charging decisions, although at greater cost
(defense lawyer time is expensive) than my approach of placing prosecutors in
charge of jails. Either of our proposals, if successful at reducing incarceration,
might also reduce the impact of zero-tolerance policing that falls on minority
communities. See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to
Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 285, 286-87 (2014) (describing the problem of aggressive zero-tolerance
policing and prosecution in minority communities and advocating that
prosecutors "decline to prosecute minor offenses where arrest patterns show a
disparate impact on racial minorities").
141. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1713-16 (2010).
142. Id. at 1716-17.
143. Id. at 1715-18. This type of data is unfortunately quite difficult to
locate.
144. Id. at 1717.
145. Id. at 1718-19.
146. Id. at 1705-10. In particular, see id. at 1709 ("A charge leads almost
inevitably and quickly to some adjudication of guilt."); see also MALCOLM M.
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT 30-31 (1979).
147. See Bowers, supra note 141, at 1710-11.
148. See id. at 1711.
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could still use pre-trial incarceration as leverage, but they would
have to pay for it, rather than foisting the costs and responsibilities
onto the sheriffs who pay the bills for the jails. Placing prosecutors
in charge might therefore result in prosecutors declining charges in
low-level misdemeanor cases much more often.
3. Faster and More Lenient Disposition of Felony Cases
A less obvious benefit of putting prosecutors in charge of local
jails is that it might spur lower plea bargain offers in felony cases.
Felony defendants typically serve their time in state prisons, 149 but
that does not mean felony defendants are never inmates in local
jails. Most felony defendants spend months in local jails before they
agree to a plea bargain (or, in rare cases, before proceeding to
trial).150 If prosecutors ran the jails, they would have an incentive to
move felony defendants to their new homes in state-funded facilities
as quickly as possible. The easiest way to move felony defendants
off of the prosecutors' balance sheets and into state prison beds
would be to plea bargain their cases faster. And the easiest way to
plea bargain cases faster would be to offer defendants more lenient
plea deals.1 51 While the downward trend in sentences could not last
forever, 152 it might slightly reset the "going rate" for certain offenses
at a lower level and thus reduce up-front sentences moving forward.
B. The Continued Role of Sheriffs
Placing prosecutors in charge of jails would not entirely
eliminate sheriffs from the picture. The sheriff would still be in
charge of hiring jailers, deciding how many guards to staff on each
149. See Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 12, at 93.
150. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The average time from
arrest to disposition for incarcerated defendants in felony cases exceeds two
months. Id.
151. Prosecutors could also speed up the processing of felony cases by
increasing the number of prosecutors who work with grand juries. Prosecutors
ordinarily are not under intense pressure to quickly indict suspects. See, e.g.,
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.151 (West 2015) (requiring release from
custody only if no indictment is issued within 90 days for felony charges). If
prosecutors increased grand jury staffing, indictments would come faster and
cases would plead more quickly. See, e.g., Jim Walsh, Camden County Jail
Overcrowded Again, COURIER-POST (Aug. 11, 2014, 3:21 PM),
http://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/local/south-jersey/ 2 01 4 /0 8/lO
/camden-county-jail-overcrowdedi13874379 (explaining that, in an effort to
reduce jail overcrowding in Camden County, New Jersey, the district attorney
"bolstered its staff to accelerate the handling of inmates' cases," and "stepped
up efforts to move cases toward a grand jury and an inmate's potential
indictment"). Of course, increasing staffing in the grand jury division would
cost money.
152. Prosecutors must stand for re-election, and there is only so far they can
go in reducing felony sentences before lighter plea bargains become a political
liability. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 93, at 603-04.
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shift, and determining how to discipline inmates. 153 Day-to-day
responsibility for running the jail would still remain in the sheriffs'
hands. All that would change is that the prosecutors-not sheriffs-
would have ultimate responsibility for budgeting and the paperwork
of inmates entering and leaving the jails.
By way of analogy, think of the F.B.I. The director of the F.B.I.
runs day-to-day operations. The director is responsible for hiring
and firing agents and for resource allocation within the bureau.154
But the F.B.I. is not a completely autonomous agency. It has long
been under the umbrella of the Department of Justice. 155 Indeed,
the F.B.I. was created in 1908,156 but was not a paragon of integrity
in its initial years. 157 In the mid-1920s, Attorney General Harlan
Stone moved to reign in the bureau by having the director report
directly to the Attorney General. 158 When errors or problems occur
at the F.B.I., the Attorney General cannot say the Department of
Justice bears no responsibility.
Consolidating local power in the hands of one entity
(prosecutors) rather than separating it between two local
departments (prosecutors and sheriffs) would result in two key
changes. First, sheriffs would no longer be forced to petition county
commissioners for funds to run the jails. 159 Rather, prosecutors
would be responsible for negotiating the jail budget with the county
commissioners. No longer would sheriffs and prosecutors be
pointing fingers at each other about who is responsible for jail
153. Cf. MARK D. MARTIN & PAUL KATSAMPES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SHERIFF'S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE JAIL OPERATIONS 5-6 (2007), http://info.nicic.gov
/nicrp/?q=system/files/021925.pdf (noting a sheriffs leadership, management,
and supervisory role).
154. See FBI Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 283 (2006) (statement of Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI)
("[W]e continue to reshape our human resources program to recruit, hire, train,
and retain quality individuals.").
155. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/when-was-the-fbi-founded (last visited July 26,
2016).
156. Id.
157. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW
149 (1956) ('When I became Attorney General,' Stone recalled in
1937, ... '[t]he Bureau was filled with men with bad records .... The
organization was lawless, maintaining many activities which were without any
authority in federal statutes, and engaging in many practices which were brutal
and tyrannical in the extreme."').
158. See id. at 150.
159. See, e.g., Houston Holding Cells Are Jam Packed, Inspectors Say, TEX.
JAIL PROJECT (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.texasjailproject.org/2011/10/houston
-jail-is-jam-packed-fails-inspection (describing sheriffs unsuccessful request for
funding and quoting a county commissioner as saying it is the sheriffs job "to
make it clear to the courts that we are having too many people in the holding
cells, and we can't bring more over until they clear them out").
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conditions and overcrowding. 160 Second, because the prosecutors
would be in charge of the budget, as well as the ministerial task of
checking inmates in and out of the jail, they would be better
informed about jail budgets and overcrowding and would be
incentivized to adjust their plea bargain offers accordingly. In short,
consolidating local criminal justice power would result in a unified
budget and prosecutorial decisions that take account of that budget.
C. Responding to Objections
There are two major objections to a proposal to make
prosecutors responsible for jail budgets. One concern is that
prosecutors will shortchange the safety budget and spend more
money on prosecuting inmates than funding guards and
guaranteeing safety. A second worry is that prosecutors would seek
to increase charges in borderline cases in order to convict inmates of
felonies (rather than misdemeanors) and send them to state-funded
prisons rather than prosecutor-managed jails. I take these
objections in turn.
1. Will Prosecutors Shortchange the Security Budget?
First, and most importantly, critics might question whether
placing prosecutors at the top of the organizational chart for jails
would compromise the safety of the inmates and the sheriffs'
deputies who are running the day-to-day operations of the jails. The
argument would go like this: Prosecutors want credit for imposing
tough sentences. When jail funds dry up, prosecutors would not
want to drop cases or negotiate lighter sentences, so they would
skimp on jail safety. They would continue to incarcerate the same
number of inmates, but they would allocate less money for hiring
guards and paying overtime. The jails would then become less safe,
and the conditions of confinement would deteriorate.
This parade of horribles is ultimately unpersuasive. Because
prosecutors would be at the top of the organizational chart and have
official responsibility for the jails, they would bear political
responsibility for overcrowding and safety problems. At present,
when a jail inmate dies in custody because of inadequate medical
care or because of violence due to overcrowding, the local television
stations and newspapers turn to the sheriff and demand answers.
161
If prosecutors held final responsibility for the jails, the news media
160. See, e.g., id.
161. There are hundreds of stories to choose from. For a recent example, see
Frank S. Abderholden, Lake County Jail Inmate Dies: Sheriff's Office, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 4, 2016, 6:21 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/lake-county
-news-sun/crime/ct-lns-lake-county-jail-inmate-dies-st-030 5 -2 0160304
-story.html.
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would instead turn to the chief prosecutor for an explanation. 162
The prosecutor might try to slough off responsibility by saying the
sheriff is in charge of day-to-day security. But the prosecutor would
know that the sheriff can turn to the media and say that she was
denied proper funding by the prosecutor. The sheriff would explain
that she requested funding for guards and that the prosecutor
refused it. What would have been a one-day story would then
occupy multiple news cycles, with the media ferreting out "who is to
blame." In short, if the prosecutor were identified as the top jail
official, it would be difficult for her to say the problems are "not my
fault."
Relatedly, prosecutors would find it difficult to divert money
previously used for jail safety and instead invest it in more jail beds.
Jail facilities are only so large and can only physically hold so many
inmates. And jails are supervised and certified by state agencies. 163
Prosecutors would find it no easier than sheriffs to permanently
flout the capacity rules.
Of course, prosecutors could get around the capacity problem by
filling up all the beds in the local jails and then contracting with
out-of-jurisdiction jails to take excess inmates. Some sheriffs
presently do this.164 The problem is that contracting with other
facilities is very expensive. 165 Prosecutors would likely have to go
back to the county commissioners to seek extra funding.1 66 And
while prosecutors might have marginally more luck than sheriffs in
shaking loose funds, they are unlikely to fare much better.
Prosecutors already struggle to adequately fund their offices, 167 so it
is difficult to see how they would convince county commissioners to
be more generous in jail funding. Moreover, the logistics of
transporting inmates back and forth to another county are
onerous1 68 and prosecutors would want to avoid any added
complications in running the jails.
162. Moreover, prosecutors would also be named in lawsuits that are now
typically filed against sheriffs departments. Again, there are hundreds of
examples to choose from. For a recent one, see St. John Barned-Smith,
Galveston County Sheriff Faces Federal Lawsuit After Inmate's Death, Hous.
CHRON. (Mar. 14, 2016, 12:46 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas
/article/Parents-sue-Galveston-County-Sheriff-s-Office-6888759.php.
163. See Michele Deitch, Independent Correctional Oversight Mechanisms
Across the United States: A 50-State Inventory, 30 PACE L. REv. 1754, 1755-56
(2010).
164. See supra notes 54, 59 and accompanying text.
165. See Rubino, supra note 59.
166. Cf. id. (noting that the sheriffs request for a nearly $500,000 budget
increase was in part due to the expensive cost of transporting inmates).
167. See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 93, at 265.
168. See, e.g., Caitlin VanOverberghe, Inmate Transfer Program Hits Legal
Snag, DAILY REP. (June 16, 2016), http://www.greenfieldreporter.com/2016
/06/16/inmatetransfer-programhitslegal-snag/ (reporting that plans to
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To turn back to the F.B.I. analogy, the American public is not
less safe because the F.B.I. is housed inside of the Department of
Justice. To the contrary, one would hope that the F.B.I. works more
closely with other Justice Department agencies because they are
under the same umbrella. It is of course possible that putting
prosecutors in charge of jail budgets would undermine jail safety.
But given that most prosecutors are elected officials 169 and that the
media already focuses on jail overcrowding, 170 it is difficult to see
how prosecutors could undermine safety without risking serious
reputational repercussions. 171
2. Would Prosecutors Try to Turn Misdemeanors into Felonies
to Send Defendants to State Prisons?
A second, and quite serious, objection to a proposal to put
prosecutors in charge of jails is that it would incentivize them to
push for felony convictions when they would otherwise have been
satisfied with misdemeanor convictions. In other words, if
prosecutors have to pay for jails, they might seek to have borderline
defendants (those who could have served jail time for misdemeanor
convictions) plead to felonies that will result in prison time paid for
by the state. Prosecutors might push harder for felony convictions
to shift incarceration costs to the state.
For example, imagine that two intoxicated men-Victor and
Dan-have been verbally antagonizing each other in a bar. Victor
goes a little too far-perhaps he makes a derogatory remark about
Dan's girlfriend-and Dan responds by punching Victor in the face
and breaking his nose. Under most criminal codes there are at least
two ways to resolve this case.172 Dan could be guilty of aggravated
assault-a felony-because Victor has suffered serious bodily
injury. 173 On the other hand, it is not clear that a broken nose
transfer inmates from an overcrowded jail in southern Indiana were "stalled"
while "county officials debate[d] potential liability issues").
169. This, of course, is not to say that prosecutor elections actually deliver
better results. See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 581-82 (2009).
170. See, e.g., Adam Banner, The Economics of Incarceration: Overcrowded
Prisons and Overcharged Prisoners, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2016, 1:13 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-banner/the-economics-of-incarcer-b-
9408800.html.
171. Moreover, any cost-benefit analysis would have to consider not just the
risk that prosecutorial control of jails could negatively affect safety, but also the
possibility that it could ameliorate current safety problems. Presently
overcrowded jails already pose a safety risk to guards and inmates. If placing
prosecutors in charge might reduce the jail population (and hence the safety
risk) then we must consider this in calculating the risk.
172. Assault is a "deep" type of crime with numerous different offenses. See
Wright & Engen, supra note 5, at 1959-61.
173. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)(1) (West 2015).
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
amounts to serious bodily injury in all instances, 174 so a charge of
simple assault-a misdemeanor-might be more appropriate. 175
What would a prosecutor ordinarily do in this situation? Given that
Victor and Dan had both been drinking, and given that Victor had
escalated the situation by insulting Dan's girlfriend, the prosecutor
might agree to a simple assault charge. If Dan pled guilty to that
charge, he would serve his time in the local jail. Arguably, this
would be the most just outcome. But if the prosecutor had to pay for
Dan's incarceration because she runs the jail, the prosecutor might
insist on the aggravated assault charge so that Dan would serve his
time in state prison.
This borderline-felony problem is a serious concern, and not one
that would be limited to assault cases. Prosecutors would likely face
the same calculus in cases involving theft, evading arrest, and a
host of other offenses. I cannot deny that this situation would occur,
but there are reasons to think it would not pose an enormous
problem.
First, plea bargains are determined in the shadow of trial and
judicial sentencing. 176 If juries would not convict a defendant of
aggravated assault in broken nose cases, then prosecutors will be
unable to compel defendants to plead guilty to those felony
charges. 177
Second, and related, the plea bargain system works efficiently
because there are "going rates" for situations that regularly occur.17 8
For instance, even though DWI carries an authorized sentence of six
months or longer in many jurisdictions, it is well known that
defendants will ordinarily receive a sentence of time-served if they
plead guilty.1 79 The going rate is determined in the shadow of trial
and is typically well established.18 0 If a prosecutor insists on a
penalty above the going rate, she would need a credible threat that a
174. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887, 888-89 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that a broken nose was insufficient to support an
aggravated assault charge), with Pollard v. State, 495 S.E.2d 629, 630-31 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that evidence of a broken nose was sufficient to support
an aggravated battery conviction).
175. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(a) (West 2015).
176. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992). For a more complicated assessment of the
factors that affect plea bargains, see generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2464 (2004).
177. Cf. Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593,
596-97 (2014) ("Juries offer [a] potential source of accountability for prosecutors
because they enforce the legal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Prosecutors who take charges to trial without the facts to back them up can
expect to lose.").
178. See Bibas, supra note 176, at 2481.
179. Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating
Jury Trials in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 978, 985 (2011).
180. See Bibas, supra note 176, at 2467, 2481.
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judge would impose a higher penalty than the plea offer.18 ' And if
the trial judge suspects that the prosecutor is getting tougher in
order to push inmates out of the local jail and into the state prison,
the judge may very well resist by issuing lighter sentences in cases
that go to trial.182
CONCLUSION
The United States is plagued by the problem of mass
incarceration. Of the 2.2 million people who are incarcerated, more
than 700,000 are in local jails.'8 3 Prosecutors have enormous power
to charge defendants, which leads to their pre-trial incarceration in
jails. And prosecutors have tremendous leverage to pressure
defendants to plead guilty to misdemeanors that will result in jail
sentences. Yet, once defendants leave the courtroom, prosecutors no
longer have to worry about them. Prosecutors do not have to
internalize the costs of their charging and plea bargain decisions
because sheriffs run the jails. When prosecutors send inmates to
jails, sheriffs must find beds for them to sleep in and funds to pay
for their food, security, and medical care. The so-called correctional
free lunch is not just a problem involving county prosecutors and
state prisons. Prosecutors get a free lunch when they send inmates
to local county jails that are just down the street.
This Essay proposes taking a bite out of the correctional free
lunch by placing prosecutors in charge of their local jails.
Prosecutors should be at the top of the organizational chart. Not
only should they be responsible for the overall jail budget, but they
should also be responsible for the logistical task of checking each
inmate in and out of the jail. These financial and logistical
responsibilities should hopefully lead to a gradual decline in
incarceration. Jail populations should decrease because prosecutors
would offer more lenient plea offers and downgrade or dismiss
charges in an effort to make jail populations more manageable. And
there may be spillover effects in felony cases as prosecutors seek to
move pre-trial detainees out of local jails and into state prisons by
offering better plea deals that will encourage defendants to more
quickly plead guilty.
As with prisons, it has taken decades for jail populations to rise
to their current high levels. Placing prosecutors in charge of local
jails would not return jail populations to the considerably lower
levels of the 1970s. But it would be a productive step toward slowly
decreasing incarceration in jurisdictions across the United States.
181. See Covey, supra note 84, at 1246.
182. Cf. Bibas, supra note 176, at 2520 (observing that "judges seem to be
just as susceptible as laymen to anchoring and egocentric biases").
183. MINTON, supra note 48, at 1.
